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Summary
“Identifying Cartels that Use the Illinois Brick Ruling as a Shield” looks at a landmark Supreme Court
ruling, known as the Illinois Brick (IB) decision, which bars “indirect purchasers” from bringing antitrust
suits against upstream product manufacturers. The research suggests the IB ruling not only reduced the
costs associated with antitrust enforcement but has the potential to enable firms upstream in the supply
chain to engage in collusion through the use of the wholesale price plus fixed fee structure (WPFF). WPFF
allows manufacturers to pay a fixed fee to retailers, compensating them for stocking fewer, higher cost
items than they would under perfect competition. The fee acts as a disincentive for retailers to level
antitrust suits against manufacturers. And consumers, whose welfare is reduced by the collusion, are
forbidden from bringing antitrust action by the IB ruling. The incentive to collude is greater when demand
uncertainty for a product is higher, the number of retailers in the market is higher, and the number of
manufacturers is lower. Public enforcers of antitrust law can use this knowledge to focus their monitoring
efforts on firms embedded in the type of supply chain structures described here while using WPFF
contracts.
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In 2007, a civil suit was filed against a group of cathode ray tube (CRT)
manufacturers—including Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd., Philips Electronics NA,
Panasonic Corp., LG Electronics Inc., and Toshiba Corp.—for fixing prices over
the 12-year period from March 1, 1995 to November 25, 2007.1
After a tedious damage discovery process spanning several years, a group of plaintiffs (the so-called
indirect purchaser plaintiffs) who had bought the
overpriced CRTs through intermediaries reached
settlements amounting to $576 million.2 Although the
California Northern District Court finally approved
the settlements in 2016, it limited the monetary compensation to those states that had enacted “repealer”
statutes in response to the U.S. Supreme Court judgment in a landmark case: Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois
(431 U.S. 720, 1977). The CRT case was just one of
thousands of legal cases—involving products as diverse
as credit cards, pharmaceutical drugs, and airline
flights—affected by this Supreme Court ruling.
The Illinois Brick (IB) decision bars an indirect
purchaser (e.g., consumer) from suing and recovering antitrust damages based on a “pass-on” claim
charged by an upstream firm (e.g., manufacturer) that
gets passed-on to them by an intermediary firm (e.g.,
retailer). The legal intuition behind the judgment is
that indirect purchaser suits could transform “into
massive multiparty litigations involving many distribution levels and including large classes of ultimate

SUMMARY
• The landmark Supreme Court ruling in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois
(IB), which bars “indirect purchasers” from bringing antitrust suits
against upstream product manufacturers, has greatly reduced the
legal costs associated with antitrust enforcement.
• The ruling also might have another, lesser-known result: it has the
potential to enable firms upstream in the supply chain to engage
in collusion through the use of a particular contract structure—the
wholesale price plus fixed fee structure (WPFF).
• The key component of the WPFF structure is a slotting fee, by which
manufacturers agree to pay a fixed fee to retailers, compensating
them for stocking fewer, higher cost items than they would under
perfect competition. The fee acts as a disincentive for retailers to
level antitrust suits against manufacturers. And consumers, whose
welfare is reduced by the collusion, are forbidden from bringing
antitrust action by the IB ruling.
• The research suggests that the incentive to collude is greater when
demand uncertainty for a product is higher, the number of retailers
in the market is higher, and the number of manufacturers is lower.
• Public enforcers of antitrust law can use this knowledge to focus
their monitoring efforts on firms embedded in the type of supply
chain structures described here while using WPFF contracts.
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consumers remote from the defendant,”3 ultimately undermining the
effectiveness of the suits, and resulting
in an astronomical increase in administrative and legal costs. Hence the
judgment prevents purchasers from
suing unless they directly suffered the
antitrust injury. Practically speaking,
only retailers—and not consumers—can file antitrust claims against
product manufacturers.
Since its inception, the IB ruling has attracted considerable debate
among scholars and practitioners
alike. Notably, the Department of
Justice under President Trump has
recently taken public positions both
against and, later, in support of this
law, signaling a desire to overturn and,
shortly afterwards, uphold the practice at the federal level of prohibiting
indirect purchaser suits.4 Over the last
four decades, in fact, 26 U.S. states
and Washington, D.C. have introduced varying forms of IB “repealers.”5 The other 24 states continue to
support the IB ruling, recognizing its
role in limiting administrative burdens (see Figure 1)—a role that is not
insignificant. On average, the cost of
administering a settlement fund (as a
percentage of the settlement amount)
associated with indirect purchaser
suits is more than 75% higher (2.42

percentage points) than the cost
for direct purchaser suits (5.63% vs.
3.21%).6

ers (i.e., firms, in their roles as direct
purchasers) in curbing, via lawsuits,
the anti-competitive behavior of other

FIGURE 1: STATES AND THE ILLINOIS BRICK RULING IN 2019
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Although the IB ruling reduced
legal costs by precluding indirect
purchaser suits, it has also enabled
upstream firms to collude, simply
through the use of pre-specified fixed
payments to their intermediaries, as
will be discussed below. These payments attenuate the incentives of
their direct purchasers to file antitrust
suits.7 In other words, the ruling
weakens the role of private enforc-

firms. As a result, public enforcers
(i.e., government entities) must, via
regulatory monitoring, step up their
efforts. This raises a conundrum: how
can the IB-related benefits of lower
legal costs be retained without either
significantly increasing public enforcement costs8 or suffering the adverse
consequences of anti-competitive
behavior in the market?

NOTES
1		J.

S. Tigar (US District Court Judge), “Case No. C-07-5944
JST, MDL No. 1917,” July 7, 2016, http://bit.ly/2C5OS0U
(accessed 20 April 2018).
2		The settlements comprised agreements with Samsung for
$225 million, Philips for $175 million, Panasonic for $70
million, Toshiba for $30 million, Hitachi for $28 million,
LG for $25 million, Chunghwa for $10 million, and a joint
agreement with Thomson and TDA for $13.75 million.
3		Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 1977.
4		Mary Strimel and Emre Ilter, “Trump DOJ’s Next Target:
the Illinois Brick Indirect Purchaser Rule?” The National

Law Review, February 2, 2018. Also Grant Schnell, “Trump
DOJ’s Antitrust Enforcement Policies Are Predictably
Unpredictable,” JDSUPRA, May 21, 2018, https://www.
jdsupra.com/legalnews/trump-doj-s-antitrust-enforcement-55848/.
5		Michael A. Lindsay, “Overview of State RPM,” American Bar
Association, April 2017 (accessed 20 April 2018). Among
these 26 states, four authorize their respective attorneys
general (as parens patriae) to secure monetary relief for
indirect damages, two allow the state (or any of its political
subdivisions) to bring an action for indirect damages, and

2

one state allows its courts to make additional orders or
judgments as may be necessary to recover indirect damages.
6		J.P. Davis and J.H. Lande (2012), “Toward an Empirical and
Theoretical Assessment of Private Antitrust Enforcement,”
Seattle UL Rev., 36:1269, p. 1307, table 11.
7		M. Pieter Schinkel et al. (2008), “Illinois Walls: How Barring
Indirect Purchaser Suits Facilitates Collusion,” The RAND
Journal of Economics, 39(3): 683-698.
8		In a recent report to the U.S. Congress, the Office of Management and Budget estimated the administrative cost of
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DIGGING INTO THE
DIFFERENT CONTRACTS

The solution to this conundrum
may lie in improving the ability of
public enforcers to identify the firms
that are most likely to commit IBenabled antitrust violations. Since the
IB ruling weakens the incentives of
private enforcers to act, we examine
whether supply chain interactions can
be used to improve public enforcement.9 We focus specifically on the
procurement contracts between a
manufacturer and its direct purchasers. A choice of contractual agreement
between two supply chain members
not only determines the supply chain’s
overall efficiency, but it is also instrumental in determining how the resulting profits are allocated.10 Market
conditions may lead to a preferential
ranking (by supply chain members)
among contractual agreements that
might otherwise seem to be equivalent.11
Motivated by these observations,
we compare the extent to which
five common contractual structures
facilitate anti-competitive (collusive)
decision-making among firms. If these
contract types do differ on that score,
then public enforcers can enact simple
rules that will improve their ability to
select appropriate cases for investigation of antitrust violations and thereby
reinforce the IB framework.

from manufacturers to retailers—
sometimes referred to as a slotting
fee—and it enables manufacturers
not only to form but also to sustain a
cartel. In the presence of the IB ruling, manufacturers are no longer indifferent towards the five contractual
structures: there is a clear preference
for WPFF in light of the IB ruling.
The feature that any WPFF contract must have in order for collusion
to be feasible is the use of slotting
fees. Under a WPFF contract, manufacturers agree to pay a fixed fee to
retailers (similar to the slotting fees
observed in practice), compensating them for stocking fewer, higher
cost items than they would under
perfect competition. Slotting fees, in
short, make retailers indifferent to
manufacturer collusion because they
make the retailers financially whole.
(Absent the IB ruling, manufacturers
set this fixed-fee term to zero.) Slotting fees have been a fixture since the
mid-1980s. Many reasons have been
advanced to explain their prevalence:
demand signaling and screening, cost
and risk sharing, product assortment
coordination, the exercise of market
power by retailers, and as a tool for
manufacturers to gain competitive
foreclosure.12 But we highlight an
additional factor that encourages a

We model a three-tier supply
chain that consists of manufacturers, retailers (direct purchasers), and
consumers (indirect purchasers) in the
context of the IB ruling. For each of
five different contractual structures—
wholesale price, minimum order
quantity, wholesale price plus fixed
fee, revenue-sharing, and quantity
discounts—we study the propensity of
manufacturers to collude. We find that
the five types of contracts are quite
distinctive in their ability to facilitate
collusion. Specifically, no collusion
is feasible under the wholesale price,
minimum order quantity, revenuesharing, and quantity discount
contracts. Although manufacturers
could earn more profit by colluding
under these four contract types, those
structures would reduce retailer profits
in comparison with a competitive
decision-making scenario. Retailers
would take legal action against any
collusive behavior by manufacturers
under such contracts and, as a result,
manufacturers would not be able to
sustain a cartel.
In contrast, the wholesale price
plus fixed fee (WPFF) structure
facilitates collusion via a side payment

NOTES
the country’s 129 major regulations to be between $74
billion and $110 billion (in 2014 dollars) over the ten-year
period from 2005 to 2014. See Competitive Enterprise
Institute, Ten Thousand Commandments, Annual Survey,
2017.
9		The principal source of this Issue Brief is Nitish Jain, Sameer Hasija, and Serguei Netessine (2018), “Supply Chains
and Antitrust Governance.”
10		 Gerard Cachon (2003), “Supply Chain Coordination with
Contracts,” Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, 11:227-339.

Gerard Cachon and A.G. K ̈ok (2010), “Competing Manufacturers in a Retail Supply Chain: On Contractual Form and
Coordination,” Management Science, 56(3): 571-589.
12		 For a comprehensive survey of academic and practitioner
views on the practice of slotting fees, the reader is referred
to Bloom et al. (2000), “Slotting Allowances and Fees:
Schools of Thought and the Views of Practicing Managers,”
Journal of Marketing, 64(2):92-108.
13		 We used the A. C. Nielsen Homescan panel data set (Albuquerque and Bronnenberg 2009, Hwang and Park 2015),
which records both the food and non-food purchases of
11		

3

14		

registered panelists.
Cachon, supra note 8. See also P. Rasmussen, “What Are
the Factors Driving MOQ?” East West, July 12, 2017,
http://bit.ly/2J7t43R (accessed 20 April 2018).
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TABLE 1: DEMAND UNCERTAINTY—REPRESENTATIVE PRODUCTS

supply chain’s use of slotting fees,
namely that firms may use them solely
to enact collusive actions under the
IB ruling. That said, manufacturers
can cite the aforementioned reasons—
however misleadingly—to justify the
collusion-enabling fixed payments
made to retailers.
Under collusion, manufacturers
set a higher wholesale price than
under competition. In terms of social
welfare, we find that in the presence
of the IB ruling, under the WPFF
contract structure, both consumer
surplus and total surplus are lower
than under competition. In sum, we
find that the IB ruling induces a preferential ranking, from the standpoint
of manufacturers, among contract
structures to which they would be
indifferent in the absence of that
ruling. Public enforcers of antitrust
regulations can exploit this finding
to improve case selection by focusing
on supply chains that employ WPFF
contracts with slotting fees.

USING MARKET DEMAND
TO TARGET ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT
The WPFF contract structure
facilitates manufacturer collusion under all demand scenarios. In
practice, however, manufacturers’
incentives to collude will depend
on the monetary gain that can be
achieved through collusion. A higher
gain implies that, under collusion,
manufacturers not only have a higher
potential to increase their individual
profits, but also have a greater flexibility in using fixed payments to mitigate
retailers’ incentive towards filing an
antitrust lawsuit. Thus, a better under-

DEMAND UNCERTAINTY
PRODUCT-TYPE

Low

Medium

High

Food and
Beverages

Canning and
Freezing Supplies,
Ice, Fruit-Dried

Baby Food, Baked
Goods-Frozen,
Beer, Baking
Mixes,Breakfast
Food-Frozen, Eggs,
Fresh Meat

Cereal, Butter and
Margarine, Cheese,
Carbonated Drinks,
Fresh Produce, Ice
Cream, Pet Food,
Snacks, Yogurt

Non-Food

Automotive,
Photographic
Supplies, Cosmetics,
Charcoal and Logs,
Disposable Diapers,
Electronics-RecordsTapes, Men’s
Toiletries

Batteries and
Flashlights, Haircare,
Oral Hygiene,
Glassware, Hardware
and Tools, Cold and
Cough Remedies

Stationery and
School Supplies,
Paper Products

standing of the factors that influence
gains under collusion would enable
antitrust public enforcers to effectively
select product categories for monitoring anti-competitive actions.
To that end, we compiled data
on all purchases made by a random
sample of 10,000 customers over the
five-year period 2004–2009.13 We
found that the supply chain profit
difference between the competition
and collusion scenarios increases with
respect to one variable in particular:
demand uncertainty (i.e., the ability of a firm or industry to accurately
predict consumer demand for its
products or services). For highdemand uncertainty products, the
profit difference ranges from 13.8%
to 23.5%, while the profit difference
for medium-demand uncertainty
products ranges from 13.6% to 17.5%
and that for low-demand uncertainty
products ranges from 12.1% to 12.3%.
Since manufacturers are more likely
4

to collude in product categories for
which demand uncertainty is higher,
it follows that public enforcers can
make the most efficient use of their
limited resources by prioritizing cases
of product categories characterized by
high demand uncertainty over categories within which product demand is
more certain. Some examples of each
category are in Table 1.
The incentive for manufacturers to
collude also increases with the number
of retailers. Robust retailer competition leads to lower prices, lower supply
chain profit, and lower profits for
individual retailers. But by colluding,
manufacturers are effectively able to
control retailers’ supply to the market and, thus, drive the supply chain
profits upwards. Hence the presence
of a greater number of retailers makes
it more likely that manufacturers will
form a cartel using WPFF contracts.
Finally, given the challenges involved
in coordinating anticompetitive
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behavior among larger numbers of
firms, the incentive for manufacturers
to collude decreases as the number of
(and competition among) manufacturers increases.

THE BIG TAKEAWAY FOR
POLICYMAKERS
The Illinois Brick ruling encourages anti-competitive actions among
upstream firms. It can act as a legal
shield for colluding firms if they can
eliminate the threat of a lawsuit arising from their direct purchasers.
We can now profile the most likely
offenders, however. Public enforcers of
antitrust law can focus their monitoring efforts on firms embedded in supply chain structures that meet these
criteria. Specifically, collusive manufacturer behavior, shielded by the IB
ruling, is most likely to occur in cases
where manufacturers use (1) wholesale
price plus fixed fee contracts (supported by the use of slotting fees), in
product categories marked by (2) high
demand uncertainty, (3) high retailer
competition, and (4) low manufacturer competition. This knowledge
can lead to significant administrative cost savings for public enforcers
given that WPFF contracts are widely
prevalent in practice.14 Targeted
regulatory monitoring, furthermore,
could provide support for the Illinois
Brick framework—namely its legal
and administrative cost reduction benefits—going forward.

5
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